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There is good evidence that, in general, autonomic conditioning in humans occurs only when 
subjects can verbalise the contingencies of conditioning. However, one form of conditioning, 
evaluative conditioning (EC), seems exceptional in that a growing body of evidence suggests that it 
can occur without conscious contingency awareness. As such, EC offers a unique insight into what 
role contingency awareness might play in associative learning. Despite this evidence, there are 
reasons to doubt that evaluative conditioning can occur without conscious awareness. This paper 
aims to critically review the EC literature and draw some parallels to what is known about 
autonomic conditioning. In doing so, some important general issues about measuring contingency 
awareness are raised. These issues are illustrated with a brief report of an experiment in which a 
sensitive measure of contingency awareness is compared against a commonly used measure.  
2: Introduction 
2.1. Classical Conditioning and the Measurement of Contingency Awareness 
 
Classical conditioning is typically thought of as a behavioural change resulting from learning to 
associate two stimuli. Prokasy (1965) defined it as a set of experimental operations in which a 
contingency is established between a relatively neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) and a response-
eliciting unconditioned stimulus (UCS). Autonomic conditioning in humans is typically established 
using a discriminative conditioning paradigm in which one CS (the CS+) is paired contingently 
with an aversive outcome such as an electric shock, whereas another (the CS-) is paired with no 
outcome. Before conditioning, responses to the CSs are comparable, but after conditioning the CS+ 
evokes a significantly different response (a conditioned response [CR]) than the CS-. Provided that 
the stimuli used as CS+ and CS- are counterbalanced across subjects, behavioural change to the 
CS+ can be attributed to it being associated with the UCS: because the CS- has no outcome with 
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which to become associated (see Field & Davey, 1998). Although, it is well-established that 
conscious processes1 such as verbal instructions can alter CRs (Cook & Harris, 1937; Mowrer, 
1938), this finding does not mean that conditioning occurs only when participants are aware of the 
contingencies. Many studies, using masking tasks in which the CS-UCS pairings are embedded 
such that subjects are distracted from the contingencies of conditioning, have investigated 
conditioning without contingency awareness (e.g. Chatterjee & Eriksen, 1960; Dawson, 1973; 
Öhman, Ellstrom & Bjorkstand, 1976). Contingency awareness is measured post hoc with either a 
recall measure, in which subjects are asked to verbalise knowledge about when the UCS would be 
presented, or a recognition measure, in which subjects subjects have to identify which CS preceded 
the UCS. When recall measures are used, researchers report conditioning in the absence of 
contingency awareness, however, when recognition measures are used conditioning occurs only in 
aware subjects (see Dawson, 1973, Dawson & Schell, 1987 for a review). When expectancy of the 
UCS is measured on a trial-by-trial basis conditioning occurs only after the trial at which the 
subject becomes aware of the contingencies (Dawson and Biferno, 1973; Öhman et al.,1976, 
Dawson, Schell and Banis, 1986). 
This literature highlights an important issue: the way in which contingency awareness is measured 
influences the conclusions drawn. This issue is pertinent to non-conditioning paradigms in which 
awareness of experimental contingencies is measured. Shanks and St. John (1994) have identified 
two criteria for assessing contingency awareness. The information criterion refers to the need to 
establish that the information obtained by an awareness measure is the same information 
responsible for any changes in performance. This criterion addresses the problem that subjects can 
form conscious hypotheses that affect responding, but that are not detected because the awareness 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this paper, references to awareness, or conscious processes refer to knowledge, at some level, of 
experimental contingencies (be they CS-UCS contingencies, implicit learning rules, or whatever). 
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measure is directed towards a different, but correlated, set of hypotheses (Dulaney, 1962; Dulaney 
& O’Connell, 1963). In terms of conditioning paradigms, this criterion relates to whether 
contingency awareness or demand awareness is measured? Contingency awareness is whether a 
subject has knowledge of which CS (or CSs) precedes the UCS (or UCSs). Demand awareness (or 
task awareness) is the subject’s knowledge of what behavioural outcome is predicted. The 
distinction between the two types of awareness is not always clear. In the autonomic conditioning 
paradigm, a subject could be contingency aware but not demand aware by knowing that the CS+ 
always precedes the UCS without realising that responses to the CS+ should change. To be demand 
aware but not contingency aware, a subject would know that their response to the CS+ is expected 
to change, but not know which stimulus is the CS+. 
The sensitivity criterion addresses the need to construct a measure that is sensitive enough to detect 
awareness: insensitive measure can lead to the erroneous conclusion that subjects are unaware 
(Shanks & St. John, 1994). The converse problem is that a measure can be oversensitive, leading to 
subjects being classified as aware when they believe that they are guessing (see Berry, 1994). The 
resolution of these problems depends on whether it is important to detect explicit, verbalizable 
knowledge, or to tap implicit knowledge. In autonomic conditioning procedures short recognition 
questionnaires are more sensitive than recall questionnaires (Dawson and Reardon, 1973). 
2.2. Autonomic Conditioning Outside of Awareness 
 
Subliminal conditioning, in which one (or more) of the stimuli is presented at a subthreshold level, 
circumvents the sensitivity problem. When this method is used there is evidence that a CR can be 
evoked by a CS presented out of awareness if the CS-UCS association was formed in awareness 
(Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1988). Wong, Shevrin & Williams (1994) replicated this finding and 
discovered brain responses to subthreshold presentations of the CS. Esteves, Dimberg and Öhman 
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(1994a) found that CRs to angry face CS+s survived backward masking but CRs to happy face 
CS+s did not (see also Esteves, Parra, Dimberg & Öhman, 1994b). These effects have been 
replicated for fear-relevant CS+s such a snakes and spiders with electric shock UCSs (see Öhman, 
Esteves & Soares, 1995 for a review). Öhman et al. (1995) concluded that awareness of the CS-
UCS contingency is necessary only when the CS is fear-irrelevant (see Davey, 1992 for an 
alternative explanation of their work). Wong, Bernat, Bunce and Shevrin (1997) used Öhman et 
al.’s (1994a,b) paradigm to measure event-related brain potential (ERP) in a conditioning procedure 
in which the CSs were presented subthreshold. The preconditioning-postconditioning comparison 
of activity revealed ‘that the CS+ maintains its activation … while CS- decreases substantially’ (p. 
531). This finding is curious because if a specific association between the CS+ and UCS were 
formed, a change in response to the CS+ would be expected. However, scalp-recorded brain activity 
during conditioning revealed a significant discrimination between CS+ and CS-. However, the CS+ 
and CS- were not counterbalanced across subjects and, as noted earlier, this would be necessary to 
demonstrate associative learning (Field & Davey, 1998). Therefore, further work needs to be done 
to ascertain whether the learning observed by Wong et al. was associative, and whether it can occur 
using different stimuli as the CS+. Wong et al. (1997) took no electrodermal measures of CRs, so, 
although learning occurred at a neural level, it is not clear whether the neural learning would lead to 
behavioural CRs usually associated with aversive autonomic conditioning. Also, the neural learning 
appeared to be confined to the conditioning stage—postconditioning responses to the CS+ were the 
same as preconditioning—suggesting that learning was not strong enough to create behavioural 
change outside of the learning episode.  
The discrepancy between earlier work that showed that contingency awareness was necessary, and 
more recent findings, appears to support a levels-of-learning model. Razran (1955, 1971) proposed 
that learning ranged from simple non-associative learning, through associative learning such a 
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classical conditioning, to complex verbally mediated learning. Congruent with this theory is the 
idea that a low-level learning process can occur outside of awareness but that behavioural change 
(indicative of conditioning) might require conscious processing. The autonomic conditioning 
literature fits this model with the qualification that conditioning-without-awareness appears to be 
restricted to ecologically relevant conditioning episodes (such as a fear-relevant CS preceding a 
fear-evoking UCS). 
2.3. Other forms of Learning without Awareness 
 
There are numerous examples that low-level, nonassociative, learning operates without awareness 
of experimental contingencies. First, humans seem capable of extracting rules governing complex 
systems (such as artificial grammars) that allow them to perform at better than chance level on tests, 
yet they cannot verbalise these rules (see Berry & Dienes, 1993 for an extensive review). Second, 
humans can acquire encoding biases, of which they are unaware, that influence subsequent 
judgements (Lewicki, 1986; Lewicki, Czyzewska & Hoffman, 1987; Lewicki, Hill & Bizot, 1988; 
Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1992; but see Hendrickx, De Houwer, Baeyens, Eelen, & van 
Avermaet, 1997 for an alternative perspective). Finally, there is evidence that preferences to neutral 
stimuli can be influenced by both repeated exposure under degraded viewing conditions (Kunst-
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) and priming using subthreshold presentations of positive and negative 
stimuli (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Zajonc (1980) specifically suggests that affect (responses of 
liking or disliking a stimulus) is so fundamental to organisms that it should be nonconscious and 
occur without cognition. 
In conclusion, autonomic conditioning, as a general process, appears to occur in humans only when 
subjects are aware of the CS-UCS contingencies. However, there are certain responses of ecological 
importance (e.g. fear) that can be conditioned, or primed, without awareness. If affective responses 
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are so easily primed without awareness then these responses might form part of the ecologically-
relevant responses that can be classically conditioned without contingency awareness. The 
conditioning of affective responses is known as evaluative conditioning (EC). 
 
3: An Introduction to Evaluative Conditioning 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the transfer of affect from one stimulus to another through a 
conditioning paradigm. Usually, an affectively neutral CS is paired with either a liked or disliked 
UCS, resulting in the CS acquiring the same valence as the UCS with which it was paired (Levey 
and Martin, 1975). EC is a paradigmatic example of classical conditioning and so, based on 
autonomic conditioning, should occur only when subjects are aware of the CS-UCS contingencies. 
However, because of the special nature of affective responses (see above) it is feasible that EC 
could occur without contingency awareness and, prima facie, this seems to be the case. If 
contingency awareness is not necessary for conditioning affective responses, then not only does EC 
appear to be a qualitatively distinct form of conditioning (cf. Davey, 1994), but it also supports 
other evidence that humans can learn at a pre-conscious level. This finding is congruent with a 
levels-of-learning account of conditioning in which basic, ecologically important, responses can be 
acquired without conscious processing. However, a review of the literature suggests that the 
conclusion that evaluative conditioning can occur without contingency awareness may be 
premature. 
3.1. Evidence for Conditioning without Contingency Awareness using Visual 
Stimuli 
3.1.1. Evidence from EC studies 
 
Although early evidence suggested that attitudes could be conditioned without contingency 
awareness (e.g. Staats & Staats, 1957, 1958; Yavuz & Bousfield, 1959; and Pollio, 1963), Page 
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(1969, 1971, 1973, 1974) empirically refuted this work. Since then, several EC studies have led to 
the ‘well-established’ idea that evaluative responses can be elicited without contingency awareness. 
Only one study from the EC literature has systematically examined the role of awareness in EC 
(Baeyens, Eelen & Van den Bergh, 1990a). In this study, pictures of human faces were used as 
stimuli. Initially, the human faces were randomly presented to subjects who rated them along a 
scale ranging from -100 (dislike) through 0 (neutral) to +100 (like). Following these ratings, 9 
stimuli were selected to act as UCSs: the three most highly rated faces (liked UCSs), the three most 
negatively rated faces (disliked UCSs), and 3 neutral faces (control UCSs). Nine neutrally rated 
faces were selected as CSs. This process yielded nine stimulus pairs: 3 Neutral CSs paired with 
Liked UCSs (N-L Pairs), 3 Neutral-Dislike (N-D) CS-UCS pairs and 3 Neutral-Neutral (N-N) pairs. 
These CS-UCS pairs were each presented ten times according to a randomised schedule. The CS 
appeared for 1s followed by a 3s trace interval then the UCS for 1s followed by an 8s gap before the 
next pairing (the inter-trial interval, ITI). Awareness was measured both concurrently and 
postexperimentally. Concurrent awareness was assessed by asking subjects to predict which type of 
picture (liked, disliked or neutral) would follow each CS during the conditioning phase. 
Postexperimental awareness was determined using a recall task. First, subjects were given each CSs 
in turn and asked to select the appropriate UCS from a portfolio of the entire stimulus set. This 
criterion requires precise knowledge of the CS-UCS pairings and so is relatively strong (Davey, 
1994). Second, if a subject could not select the exact UCS for a given CS, a relatively weak 
criterion of whether they could identify the affective value of the UCS was used. The criteria 
adopted to indicate awareness were that the subject, for each CS, correctly identified the UCS or its 
valence. Concurrent awareness was indicated by whether a subject could correctly predict the 
affective value of the UCS on the last three conditioning trials of a CS-UCS pair. Baeyens et al.’s 
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concluded that ‘the number of contingencies a subject was aware of during conditioning in no way 
[italics added] influenced evaluative conditioning results’ (p. 14). 
The results of this study are worth detailed scrutiny because it is the only attempt to test 
systematically the role of contingency awareness in EC. I have already discussed the importance of 
accurate assessment of awareness and there are many points worth considering about the 
assessment method and analysis used. First, according to the concurrent measurement of awareness, 
subjects were aware of the vast majority of the CS-UCS contingencies (83%). Baeyens et al. looked 
at the effect of the number of pairings of which a subject was aware. The main effect and all 
interactions involving this variable were nonsignificant implying that awareness did not influence 
conditioning. The variable describing the number of pairings of which a subject was aware had six 
levels and was treated between–subjects. Given that there were eight subjects and six levels of the 
variable, there must have been at least four groups that contained only a single subject making the 
analysis unreliable and lacking statistical power. It is not surprising, therefore, that the awareness 
variable was not significant — yet the absence of significance was taken to imply that conditioning 
occurred without awareness. Furthermore, there were six different levels of contingency awareness 
(out of a possible nine) and subjects were, on average, aware of 83% of pairings (between seven 
and eight pairings out of the nine). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that few subjects fell into 
the categories of ‘aware of no contingencies’, ‘aware of 1 contingency’ or ‘aware of 2 
contingencies’, which could also account for why no effect was found. Baeyens et al. commented 
that ‘For those few stimulus pairs for which subjects were unable to give correct concurrent 
awareness responses (5 N-L, 3 N-D pairs), means were in the expected direction but not 
significantly so (+5 and -2)’ [Baeyens et al., 1990a: p. 14 italics added]. Not only does this 
statement confirm that awareness levels were very high, but also that conditioning effects were not 
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found in pairings of which subjects were unaware (although this analysis would have limited 
statistical power). 
On a different group of eight subjects, Baeyens et al. used the postconditioning awareness measure 
described earlier. Comparing it with the concurrent awareness measures taken on the other eight 
subjects validated this questionnaire and overall it correctly classified 81.2% of contingencies. 
There was a 15% probability that a contingency of which a subject was unaware (from now on 
termed an unaware contingency) was misclassified as ‘aware’. However, there was a much larger 
probability of 37% that a contingency of which the subject was aware (from now on termed an 
aware contingency) was misclassified. If the proportion of correctly/incorrectly classified aware 
contingencies (85/15) is compared to the proportion of correctly/incorrectly classified unaware 
contingencies (63/37), the Binomial test yields a highly significant result [p < 0.0012]. This finding 
suggests that the contingencies classified as ‘aware’ were classified significantly more accurately 
than those classified as unaware. Therefore, the data for aware contingencies is more accurate than 
the data for contingencies classified as unaware. This finding has some serious implications for 
Baeyens et al.’s results and conclusions. For one thing, if unaware contingencies were classified 
significantly less accurately than aware contingencies, then it is more likely that some of the 
contingencies classified as unaware in their analysis were actually contingencies of which subjects 
were aware, than vice versa. 
When only the contingencies of which subjects were unaware were analysed there was a significant 
differential rating between CSs in N-L and N-D pairings3. However, given that there was a 
significantly greater chance of classifying contingencies as unaware when subjects were aware of 
                                                          
2The Binomial statistics given here was calculated by the present author. 
3As the authors themselves note, the data were a mix of data from the same subjects and data from different subjects, 
thus violating the independence assumption of the tests used. 
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them (see earlier), this conditioning could be due to the presence of misclassified contingencies. 
The results from the contingencies classified as ‘aware’ (which showed a stronger differential 
response pattern) are much less likely to be susceptible to a misclassification error, because the 
misclassification rate was significantly lower for these contingencies than for those classified as 
unaware. 
Finally, Baeyens et al. claimed to have identified a sub-group who could be classified as unaware of 
all contingencies. This group of four subjects (an extremely small sample on which to base a 
conclusive finding) showed a significant differential response pattern to CSs paired with either 
liked or disliked UCSs. However, the problem of misclassification again arises: if 37% of 
contingencies classified as unaware, were in fact contingencies of which subjects were aware, then 
there should be, on average, 2.22 contingencies that were misclassified by the awareness 
questionnaire. So, on average, these subjects would have been aware of two or three out of the six 
affectively valenced contingencies; such awareness could contribute to the conditioning effect. 
Although it may seem churlish to scrutinise this study so closely, it has been done to illustrate some 
important points about studying contingency awareness. (1) Classification: subjects are seldom 
aware or unaware of all aspects of an experiment and so it is important to be able to accurately 
classify whether a subject was aware or unaware of the particular facet of interest. (2) 
Contamination: if subjects are aware of some, but not all, contingencies of the experiment, it is 
important that this partial awareness does not contaminate data about contingencies of which the 
subjects are unaware. (3) Definition: EC researchers have settled for a definition of awareness that 
is dependent upon verbalisable knowledge (e.g. Baeyens, De Houwer & Eelen, 1994), yet there 
may be differences between what subjects can verbalise, and the knowledge that they actually have. 
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The question of whether conditioning can occur in the absence of awareness has been investigated 
less systematically in many other studies, but with varying degrees of support. Baeyens, Crombez, 
Van den Bergh, and Eelen (1988), took measures of awareness similar to Baeyens et al. (1990a) and 
calculated an index of awareness for each subject, which did not correlate with the differential 
response between CSs in N-L and N-D pairs. Ignoring questions regarding the validity of the index 
used, there is no reason to expect that awareness should correlate with ratings of the CSs, because 
this assumes a linear relationship between the two variables. It is possible that awareness has a 
discrete relationship with conditioning (i.e. if the subject is aware of a contingency beyond some 
threshold, then conditioning will occur for that contingency). Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, and 
Crombez (1989a) also took awareness measures using a weak criterion of whether subjects were 
aware of the manipulations rather than the CS-UCS contingencies (this measure relates to demand 
awareness). Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez and Van den Bergh (1992a) also took similar awareness 
measures to Baeyens et al. (1990a) but again constructed an index of awareness rather than looking 
at the effect of awareness on a particular contingency. They compared high and low awareness 
(based on a median split of the index of awareness) and found no between-group difference (but 
with only four scores per group this analysis lacked statistical power). Finally, Baeyens, Hermans 
and Eelen (1993) found no correlational evidence of the role of awareness but again this analysis 
was not done on a per-contingency basis. 
In conclusion, much of this early work, using the visual paradigm, has led to refutable results. In 
addition, Field and Davey (in press) have identified an artefact within this ‘typical’ visual paradigm 
that led them to conclude that most of these early results (e.g. Baeyens et al. 1988, 1990a, 1993) do 
not represent conditioning. In one experiment (a replication of Baeyens et al., 1988 using the 
paradigm described for Baeyens et al., 1990a) they found conditioning effects only for CS-UCS 
pairs that were perceptually similar. However, these results were found in a non-paired and no-
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treatment control group too. In a second experiment (using an identical procedure) they showed that 
conditioning-like effects were the product of subjects recategorizing the CSs on the basis of 
whether it was more perceptually similar to the salient liked or disliked stimuli in the set. This 
similarity-based behaviour created the illusion of conditioning because CS-UCS pairings in these 
paradigms are constructed based on similarity between the stimuli. In terms of contingency 
awareness these results offer an interesting interpretation as to why conditioning-like effects could 
arise without contingency awareness: because CS ratings are not caused by associations between 
the CS and UCS, CS ratings will be independent of the CS-UCS contingencies of conditioning. 
Hence, contingency awareness is unlikely to influence responses to CSs. 
3.1.2. I Want to Buy it But I’m Not Sure Why: EC in an Advertising Context 
 
So far, the evidence for EC without contingency awareness has been controvertible, however, 
evidence from the consumer-research literature is often cited as demonstrating that conditioning can 
occur without contingency awareness. Bierley, McSweeney and Vannieuwkerk (1985) used red, 
blue and yellow geometric shapes as CSs and the music from the movie Star Wars as a positive 
UCS in a discriminative conditioning paradigm. Two experimental groups were used: in one a red 
geometric shape always preceded the music (CS+) and a yellow shape was followed by nothing 
(CS-), in the other group the reverse was true. In both groups, blue geometric shapes were followed 
by music on 50% of the trials. A CS-only control group, in which the UCS music was never played, 
and a random control group, in which the UCS music was played randomly after the CSs (so, no 
colour reliably predicted the onset of the music) were also used. After conditioning, subjects rated 
their preferences for the geometric shapes by comparing them against a ‘standard’ blue circle. Data 
from subjects broadly classified as contingency unaware—based on the weak criterion that they 
could not detect a relation between the figures, the music and preferences for the music—were 
analysed. A significant group (red CS+ vs. yellow CS+ group) × CS-colour (red vs. yellow) 
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interaction was found indicating conditioning without awareness (although conditioning 
strengthened the effect). However, the comparisons with control groups necessary to demonstrate 
that learning was associative were not made. 
Stuart, Shimp and Engle (1987) carried out four experiments investigating attitude change through 
conditioning. They used an analogous paradigm to Bierley et al. except that a neutrally valenced 
product (Brand L toothpaste) acted as a CS and positively valenced pictures acted as UCSs. The 
study included both experimental groups in which the CS predicted the positive scenes and control 
groups in which the CS, UCSs, and filler stimuli were presented randomly. Following the 
presentations, subjects rated brand L toothpaste along several affective dimensions. Stuart et al. 
took a global measure of awareness using an open-ended questionnaire tapping subjects’ beliefs 
about the purpose of the experiment. Subjects were then classified as globally aware or unaware 
depending on whether they expressed a notion that certain stimuli were presented alongside 
pleasant pictures. Stuart et al. found that awareness was a significant factor in almost half of the 
experimental conditions but not in the remainder. They concluded that conditioning could occur 
without awareness of the task. 
Unfortunately, Stuart et al. overlooked a very important finding: in all but one of the conditions 
yielding a significant main effect of task awareness, there was a nonsignificant interaction between 
awareness and the group to which the subject belonged (experimental or control). So, although task 
awareness influenced conditioning, it also affected responses in the control groups. Specifically, 
subjects globally aware of the contingencies had increased preferences towards the CS, regardless 
of whether it predicted the UCS. Therefore, the number of subjects classified as task aware in a 
particular group will influence the mean preference for the CS: the more subjects classified as task 
aware in a group the higher that group mean will be. As such, if there were more task-aware 
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subjects in the experimental groups than the control groups, then there would be increased 
preferences for the CS in the experimental group compared to the controls. Control subjects 
experienced no CS-UCS presentations, so these subjects are unlikely to be task aware (because they 
never experience the task). Support for the idea that experiencing pairings heightened task 
awareness comes from the finding that task awareness was prominent mainly in conditions in which 
there were several conditioning trials. If there were more task-aware subjects in the experimental 
groups than in the control groups then these groups would have inflated CS preferences. Therefore, 
the nonsignificant interaction between task awareness and the presentation schedule used suggests 
that conditioning trials were not responsible for the observed group differences. 
The analysis of the task awareness data casts new light on what, prima facie, appeared to be robust 
and clear-cut conditioning effects without contingency awareness. In summary, Stuart et al.’s 
experiments provide little evidence of unaware affective transfer through associative learning 
because the effects of global awareness were similar in both experimental and control conditions. 
Interestingly, this study is frequently cited in the EC literature as evidence that conditioning can 
occur in subjects who are unaware of the contingencies compared to subjects in a nonpaired control.  
Shimp, Stuart and Engle (1991) used Stuart et al.’s paradigm in a further 21 experiments but with 
actual brands of cola as CSs. Shimp et al. varied the brand of cola used as the CS and used random 
control groups for comparison. In the last 9 experiments, an awareness measure was used, which 
replaced open-ended questions with a more systematic method of assessment. After the study, 
subjects selected from four brands (the CS brand and three fillers) the brand that always preceded 
attractive visual scenes and stated how confident they were about their. If the subject selected the 
correct brand and indicated that they were ‘somewhat certain’ or ‘absolutely certain’ of their 
decision they were classified as contingency aware. This measure assesses contingency awareness 
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rather than the demand awareness measured by Stuart et al. (1987). Interestingly, when these nine 
studies were analysed with respect to contingency awareness, seven of the studies showed 
significant conditioning effects in subjects classified as contingency aware but not for either 
subjects classified as unaware or control subjects. Of these seven studies, four produced no 
conditioning effect when awareness was not considered and so contingency awareness could 
explain the conditioning effects. 
Earlier, I suggested that a clear demarcation between demand awareness and contingency 
awareness is hard to find and the consumer research highlight this point. Intuitively it seems that 
contingency awareness could lead to demand awareness and this demand awareness could explain 
why conditioning effects are present only when subjects are aware of the contingencies. Allen and 
Janiszewski (1989) addressed this issue in two experiments. The first used post hoc measures of 
awareness whereas the second attempted to systematically manipulate awareness. While carrying 
out a distracter task, subjects experienced a discriminative conditioning procedure in which some 
Norwegian words (CSs) were proceeded by positive reinforcement (subjects were congratulated for 
a correct decision) whereas others were followed by nothing. After the experiment, subjects 
indicated whether they liked or disliked each CS word. A postexperimental interview was used to 
assess whether subjects were unaware, contingency aware (aware that a certain word always 
predicted a successful response from the subject), or demand aware (aware that the presentations 
should influence their positiveness towards the word that was followed by positive information). A 
CS-only control was also used. A significantly higher preference for the CS words in the 
conditioning group compared to the CS-only control was found, and preferences for the CS+ were 
significantly greater than for the CS-. When the groups were split according to awareness the 
conditioning effects (group differences) was observed only in subjects classified as contingency 
aware or demand aware. 
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The second experiment replicated the first but awareness was manipulated by changing the 
instructions given to subjects. As well as a standard conditioning group, one group was instructed to 
pay careful attention to the words that they found easiest to get correct (this manipulation enhanced 
contingency awareness without affecting demand awareness by focussing attention on the CS-UCS 
presentations). Another group was told that people often rated more favourably the words they 
found easiest to get correct. This instruction informed subjects that the experimenter expected the 
CS to be rated more favourably, thus enhancing demand awareness without influencing contingency 
awareness. A significant within-group difference between preferences for the CS+ word and the 
CS- words was found in both the contingency-aware and demand-aware groups, but not in the 
unaware group. These two experiments support the idea that conditioning is dependent on 
awareness of some sort, although it is not clear that the demand aware group did not have some 
contingency awareness. 
The consumer research literature provides some important evidence regarding the nature of EC. 
Much of the research is directly comparable to the standard discriminative EC paradigm (notably: 
Allen & Janiszewski, 1989), and nondiscriminative paradigms such as that adopted by Hammerl 
and Grabitz (1993, 1996) (notably: Stuart et al., 1987; Shimp et al., 1991; and Bierley et al., 1985). 
The evidence from this literature strongly suggests that most of the conditioning effects can be 
explained by demand characteristics in the studies, contingency awareness or demand awareness. In 
short, awareness plays an important part in mediating the conditioning of affective responses but 
whether it is contingency awareness, demand awareness, or both that is responsible is unclear. 
3.1.3.  Evidence From Studies Using Subliminal Presentation of Stimuli 
 
One way to dissociate contingency awareness from demand awareness is to present one or more 
stimuli subliminally, and then establish whether the subjects notice the subliminal stimulus. 
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Krosnick, Betz, Jussim and Lynn (1992) reported a study in which a target stimulus (a person) was 
primed by subliminal presentations (either 13ms or 9ms) of either a positive or negative affect-
arousing image. Following the presentations, subjects rated the target person along a number of 
affective dimensions. The first experiment revealed significant differential responses to the target 
person dependent upon the emotion evoked by the subliminal prime but the authors had 
methodological reservations about the experiment. Experiment two addressed these reservations but 
revealed nonsignificant multivariate results (however, univariate analysis of the different affect 
scales revealed significant effects). The authors took no measure of the change in evaluation across 
conditioning and so there is little to suggest that these results represent associative learning rather 
than a simple priming effect (see Field & Davey, 1998). 
De Houwer, Hendrickx and Baeyens (1997) report several experiments in which the UCS was 
presented subliminally (for 28.571 ms). Affectively neutral words, and nonwords, were used as 
CSs, and affectively positive and negative words acted as UCSs. The UCSs were masked by a row 
of Xs presented for 500 ms. In all experiments, subjects rated how each CS word made them feel by 
indicating a number between -10 (very negative) and +10 (very positive). Both a subjective and 
objective measure of contingency awareness was used. The subjective measure looked at whether 
subjects had noticed anything odd during the experiment that was not mentioned in the instructions 
(the instructions did not mention the affective UCSs). De Houwer et al. argued that if subjects 
report nothing unusual then they could not have consciously perceived the UCSs. The objective 
measure was a detection task in which subjects were re-exposed to the conditioning phase, but told 
to look out for the UCSs. After each presentation of the CS, subjects noted the valence of the 
proceeding word. Subjects performing above chance on this task were classified as aware. As with 
Krosnick et al.’s study, no attempt was made to assess whether subjects were aware of the emotion 
elicited by the UCSs. Subjects could be aware of the effect that the UCS has on them without 
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consciously perceiving it visually. This awareness would need to be measured to ensure that 
conditioning occurred outside of all conscious awareness. 
The first of the four experiments failed to replicate the significant conditioning effects found by De 
Houwer, Baeyens and Eelen (1994). When analysing the two studies together, De Houwer et al. 
found no significant differences between the studies and concluded that the later was due to 
sampling variability. However, they acknowledged that their original success could also have been 
due to chance. The second experiment revealed significant differential responding, but both sets of 
CSs were rated fairly neutrally (mean for N-L pairs = 1.12, mean for N-D pairs = 0.61) regardless 
of the affective value of the UCS. Both sets of CSs were rated slightly positively, and given that 
baseline ratings were not taken before conditioning, this result cannot be taken as evidence that CSs 
acquired the valence of the UCS. Instead of randomly assigning CSs to UCSs, experiment 3 used 
fixed lists of CS words that were counterbalanced across. Analysis of subjects classified as unaware 
revealed evidence of discriminative learning but as with experiment two, all of the mean ratings 
were positive regardless of the value of the UCS (ratings ranged between 0.65 and 1.75). The 
significant conditioning effect was present in only one of the CS word-lists and item analysis 
revealed a nonsignificant effect of the type of UCS paired with a CS (p < 0.10). Experiment 4 
combined the designs of experiments 2 and 3 but revealed no evidence of conditioning. 
In three out of the five experiments (including De Houwer, Baeyens and Eelen, 1994), successful 
conditioning of contingency-unaware subjects was reported but in one of these experiments the 
effect was dependent on the CSs used. Two studies failed completely to find evidence of 
conditioning. A meta-analysis on the data, conducted by De Houwer et al., indicated a significantly 
reliable conditioning effect but with a relatively small effect size (r = 0.21). It is noteworthy that 
there is a distinction between statistical importance of an effect and the substantive importance of 
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an effect. Although, this meta-analysis reveals a statistically important effect, the small effect size 
implies an effect of little practical importance. Nevertheless, these studies offer some evidence that 
EC can occur without contingency awareness but the process is not robust. 
3.2. Evidence for EC studies using Gustatory Stimuli 
 
Although the evidence from studies using visual stimuli is controvertible, there is a considerable 
body of work on EC using tastes. The taste paradigm combines the autonomic discrimination 
paradigm and visual EC paradigm: subjects experience two neutral tastes (CSs), one paired with a 
liked or neutral taste (water alone or with sugar added) and the other paired with a disliked taste 
(typically Tween20). Unlike the visual paradigm, the same CSs and UCSs are used across subjects 
and CSs are counterbalanced. This paradigm is important because the counterbalancing of CSs 
across UCSs rules out the artefact described by Field and Davey (1997, in press). Awareness has 
typically been measured using recall measures (e.g. Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh & Crombez, 
1990b; Baeyens, Crombez, Hendrickx, & Eelen, 1995) in which subjects are asked to identify 
which flavour was presented together with the nice or nasty taste. Typically very few subjects 
identify the correct CS flavour. Despite criticisms of this paradigm (see Field and Davey, 1997, 
1998) these few studies do offer much better evidence that evaluative learning (about tastes) may 
not require conscious awareness of contingencies. For one thing it seems that subjects have 
particularly poor memory for the reinforcement history of flavours especially when identifying the 
medium in which a flavour was presented (Boakes, Stevenson & Prescott, submitted). This 
evidence suggests that the lack of awareness found in EC studies using flavours is due to specific 
difficulties in encoding flavour properties (See Stevenson, Boakes & Single, submitted). The fact 
that tastes appear unique in their encoding properties suggests that EC might mimic autonomic 
conditioning in that although conditioning usually occurs only in the presence of contingency 
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awareness, ecologically relevant associations can be learned without this awareness. Tastes 
represent a particularly important stimulus to an organism because of the possibly fatal 
consequences of ingesting a harmful substance and beneficial consequences of ingesting healthy 
substances. Theoretically, it makes sense that it is important to learn about tastes in a spontaneous 
way and this may be best achieved by learning without conscious control (Zajonc, 1980 makes a 
similar point regarding affect). 
3.3. Measurement Issues in EC: Some Recent Findings 
 
Shanks and St. John (1994) have noted that if a substantial time elapses between the test procedure 
and the measurement of awareness, there will be room for forgetting. In a study aimed at 
investigating this forgetting period, Fulcher and Cocks (1997) paired a series of pictures of flowers 
(CSs) with positive, negative or neutrally valenced words (UCSs). CSs and UCSs were 
counterbalanced across conditions making the procedure similar to the autonomic paradigm. After 
conditioning, one group rated the CSs before a recall awareness measure, a different group skipped 
the rating stage and recalled the UCS words immediately after conditioning. Subjects who rated the 
CSs before recall were significantly worse at recalling the UCS words than those who recalled the 
UCSs immediately, demonstrating that postconditioning assessments of awareness underestimate 
the level of awareness during conditioning. Fulcher and Cocks also found that when only the 
contingencies of which subjects were unaware were analysed there was no conditioning effect—
conditioning occurred only in contingency-aware subjects. Apart from supporting the position that 
contingency awareness is necessary for EC to succeed, this study illustrates that the way in which 
awareness is measured can influence whether or not a subject is categorised as being contingency-
aware or –unaware. 
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This study has important implications for evaluative conditioning experiments because awareness is 
generally measured after a test stage, therefore, these studies are not capturing ‘hot-awareness’. 
This finding implies two things: (1) most EC studies have underestimated levels of awareness; and, 
(2) subjects classified as unaware of the contingencies may be aware during conditioning (and even 
at test) but performed poorly on awareness measures because of the interval between conditioning 
and the awareness measure. Baeyens et al.’s (1990a) method of concurrent measurement overcomes 
this problem, however, this procedure itself might heighten awareness making it difficult to obtain 
information about contingencies of which a subject is unaware. 
4: Empirical Findings 
4.1. Rationale 
 
The evidence for the role of awareness in EC is complex, not least of all because many of the 
studies use non-comparable measures of awareness. Some studies have settled for measures of 
demand awareness, whereas others have focussed specifically on contingency awareness. The only 
common theme is that awareness has been measured in terms of verbalizable knowledge. Baeyens, 
De Houwer, and Eelen (1994) believe that awareness in EC should be linked to subjective, 
phenomenological experience and so verbal measures of awareness are sufficiently sensitive, 
however, they are insensitive according to Shanks and St. John’s (1994) sensitivity criterion. 
Although verbalizible knowledge is a suitable start-point, Fulcher and Cocks have shown how the 
degree to which subjects can verbalise their knowledge is influenced by when awareness is 
measured. Verbal measures of awareness may also be influenced by subjects’ reluctance to report 
knowledge of which they are unconfident. This observation may be true even in experiments where 
stimuli are presented subliminally (although De Houwer et al.’s, 1997, objective measure is likely 
to overcome this problem). The problem of having a 
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means that nearly all of the studies so far described are likely to have underestimated contingency 
awareness to some degree. This problem is not trivial because it prevents dissociation between 
evidence from subjects who were truly contingency-unaware and those who were contingency 
aware at some level but could not verbalise the knowledge they posses. Therefore, future work 
should aim to increase the sensitivity of verbal awareness measures, to reduce the period between 
conditioning and measurement of awareness, or to use alternative nonverbal measures. 
Although this paper is primarily a review of the conditioning-without-awareness literature some 
empirical results will be presented that highlight the issues raised in this paper regarding the 
accuracy of verbal measures. Specifically it addresses the need to increase the sensitivity of verbal 
measures of contingency awareness. Baeyens et al.’s (1990a) study was partially replicated 
(awareness was measured only postexperimentally). The strong awareness measures employed by 
Baeyens et al. (see earlier) was compared against a more sensitive measure of awareness that relied 
on recognising CS-UCS contingencies. The awareness measure used was a recognition procedure, 
in which subjects distinguish real CS-UCS pairings from fake pairings containing the same CS and 
a different UCS of the same affective value as the real UCS. It seems reasonable to assume that if 
subjects can successfully discriminate, at a better than chance level, between the real and fake CS-
UCS pairings, then they must possess some knowledge of the CS-UCS contingencies. The rationale 
was two-fold. First, the more sensitive awareness measure should provide more accurate 
classification of contingencies, resulting in more accurate data regarding whether EC can occur 
without contingency awareness. Second, this experiment should show that subjects in EC studies 





Subjects: Thirteen subjects were used in all: five females and eight males. Their ages ranged from 
19 to 27 years with a mean age of 21.38 years (SD = 2.26 years). 
Stimulus Material: As with Baeyens et al.’s (1990a) experiment, colour photographs of human 
faces were used a CSs and UCSs. These photographs were scanned into a computer. 
Procedure: The procedure used was ostensibly the same as that described for Baeyens et al. (1990a) 
(see earlier) except that the whole test was automated on a computer rather than using slide 
projections and image prints. The other differences were that only six stimulus pairs were used 
rather than nine and that the interval between stimuli in a pair was smaller (200 ms). 
Preconditioning: Subjects rated 70 colour images of human faces on a computer screen using a 
scale ranging from -100 (dislike) through 0 (neutral) to +100 (like). Subjects were assured that their 
ratings would be strictly confidential and were asked to be completely honest about their 
judgements. They were also told to rely on their first, immediate and spontaneous reaction to each 
picture. 
The two most highly rated faces and the two lowest rated faces were used as UCSs and eight neutral 
images (images with ratings close to zero) were used as six CSs and two control UCSs. CSs were 
randomly assigned to a UCS making six CS-UCS pairs: 2 × Neutral-Like (N-L); 2 × Neutral-
Dislike (N-D); and 2 × Neutral-Neutral (N-N). 
Conditioning: The six CS-UCS pairs were then presented 5 times each in a semi-randomised order 
Each stimulus appeared on the screen for 1 second, the interval between stimuli in a was 200ms the 
inter-trial interval was 8 seconds. 
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Postconditioning: In this stage the CSs and UCSs used during conditioning were rated using the 
same scale as the preconditioning stage. To eliminate the chance possibility of CS-UCS pairs 
appearing consecutively at this stage, the stimuli were presented in blocks (namely all of the CSs 
followed by all of the UCSs or vice versa). Stimuli within each block were presented randomly. 
Awareness Measures: There were two measures of contingency awareness used: A strong measure 
and a recognition measure. The strong measure was similar to one of the measures used by Baeyens 
et al. (1990a) and is called ‘strong’ because it measures precise knowledge of contingencies in a 
fairly strict way. Subjects were presented with each CS and asked to pick out the UCS from all of 
the remaining CS and UCS pictures. Subjects indicated whether they were Completely Sure, Rather 
Sure, Rather Unsure and Completely Unsure of their choice. The recognition measure differed in 
that subjects were expected only to differentiate actual CS-UCS pairings from decoy CS-UCS 
pairings. Subjects were presented with several pairs of faces. Each pair appeared in random order in 
the centre of the computer screen. Some of the pairs displayed were actual CS-UCS pairs from the 
conditioning stage, whereas others were pairs containing a genuine CS but a decoy UCS. The decoy 
UCS faces were selected from the preconditioning stage to have the same affective value as the 
actual UCS used during acquisition — however, none of these decoy UCSs actually appeared 
during conditioning. There were 12 pairs presented in this stage: the six actual pairs from 
acquisition (2 × N-L, 2 × N-D, 2 × N-N) and six decoy pairings. Subjects were asked to indicate, for 
each pairing, whether they definitely remembered seeing that pair during the presentation stage 
(Recognise), whether they had a gut-feeling that they had seen the pair but did not remember it 
(Know), or if they definitely knew that they had not seen that pair (No). The order of awareness 
measures was counterbalanced. 
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For the strong measure, a contingency was classified as aware (i.e. the subject was aware of that 
contingency) if the subject could identify the exact UCS with which the CS was paired during 
conditioning or chose one of the same affective value. For the recognition measure, a contingency 
was classified as aware if two conditions were met: (1) the subject indicated that they recognised or 
had a feeling that they had seen the actual CS-UCS pairing during conditioning, and (2) the subject 
indicated that they definitely had not seen the decoy pairing for that CS. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Comparison of the awareness measures 
 
Table 1 shows the classification of contingencies for both the strong awareness measure and the 
recognition awareness measure. Of the 52 decoy pairings shown in the recognition procedure, only 
three pairings were given false positive responses (i.e. subjects said they recognised, or had a 
feeling they had seen the pairing when in fact they had not). This number is only 5.8% of the decoy 
pairings. Of these false positives, two were definitely recognised and the remaining one was a know 
responses (indicating that the subject merely had a feeling they had seen the pairing). These 
statistics show that subjects were capable of accurately distinguishing between pairs they had seen 
during the conditioning stage, and decoy pairs that they had not seen. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
For the strong awareness measure, Table 1 shows that only 22 of the 52 affective pairings used 
(subjects were not required to identify the N-N pairings) were correctly identified (42.3%)4 
indicating that subjects were aware of these contingencies. For the remaining 30 contingencies, 
subjects chose the incorrect UCS indicating a lack of awareness. Using the recognition measure, 
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more than twice as many CS-UCS contingencies were classified as ‘aware’ (45 contingencies or 
86.5%). In terms of agreement between the measures, of the 22 contingencies classified as aware by 
the strong measure, 21 were similarly classified by the recognition measure5. There were only 6 
pairings classified as unaware by both measures. A binomial test performed on the percentage of 
contingencies classified as aware and unaware by the recognition measure compared to the strong 
measure revealed a significant difference (p < 0.001). This result indicates that the recognition 
measure classified significantly more contingencies as ‘aware’ than the strong measure. In addition, 
the inter-rated reliability of the scales was extremely low ( 136.0=κ , p > 0.05) indicating that there 
was a high level of disagreement between the scales. 
These data demonstrate very simply how different measurement techniques lead to large differences 
between whether a subject is deemed aware or unaware of a contingency. When subjective verbal 
measures are used there is a danger that insensitivity within the measure leads to the erroneous 
conclusion that an effect has occurred in the absence of awareness simply because aware subjects 
are incorrectly classified. Subjects in EC studies posses more contingency awareness than strong 
measures indicate. 
4.3.2. Exploratory Findings from the Recognition Measure 
 
This study is the only EC study to employ a recognition measure of awareness that seeks to tap both 
verbalisable knowledge and more implicit knowledge. As such, the results of the recognition 
awareness measure are pertinent to the issue of whether conditioning can occur within the absence 
of contingency awareness. Table 2 illustrates the number of contingencies that subjects recognised, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4This finding indicates fairly low levels of specific awareness and the overall analysis revealed no significant 
conditioning effects. 
5
 The one contingency that was classified as unaware by the recognition measure was recognised by the subject but was 
classified as unaware because the subject had a feeling that he had seen the decoy pair 
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the number that subjects had a feeling they had seen, and those that subjects were unaware of — the 
results of the strong awareness measure are also included. Of the contingencies classified as aware 
by both measures, 71.4% were definitely recognised using the recognition measure. However, a 
much lower proportion (45.8%) of the contingencies classified as unaware by the strong measure 
were recognised using the recognition measure, with the remaining 54.2% being classified as 
‘know’ responses. These proportions are significantly different using a binomial test (p < 0.001). 
This result suggests that the strong measure is not sensitive enough to detect awareness of 
contingencies that subjects have only a feeling that they have seen because proportionately more of 
these contingencies are misclassified by the strong measure. Therefore, by tapping verbalizable 
knowledge in the ‘traditional’ way, EC researchers are ignoring a great deal of information 
possessed by subjects. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Figure 1 shows the average change in ratings (postconditioning rating minus preconditioning 
rating) of CSs paired with liked and disliked UCSs. These changes are calculated relative to the 
changes observed in the control CSs paired with neutral UCSs. These changes are grouped 
according to whether the subject was explicitly aware of the contingency (recognise) or whether 
they just had a feeling that they had seen the contingency (know). Data for contingencies of which 
subjects were unaware are not presented because of the low number of cases (there was only one N-
N control contingency that fell into the unaware category). Figure 1 shows that when subjects were 
explicitly aware of the contingencies, then CSs paired with liked UCSs were rated more positively 
compared to control CSs after conditioning, and CSs paired with disliked UCSs were rated more 
negatively compared to control CSs after conditioning. When subjects had only a feeling that they 
had seen a CS-UCS pair during conditioning no such effect was observed, instead CS rating 
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increased relative to the control CS ratings regardless of the type of UCS used during conditioning. 
In the few pairings of which subjects reported being unaware, CS ratings shifted very little 
regardless of whether a liked UCS ( 00.0=X ) or disliked UCS ( 00.5−=X ) was used during 
conditioning. 
The post hoc nature of the awareness measures means that awareness is not manipulated in a 
systematic way. As such, the contingencies experienced by a subject could all fall into a single 
category (e.g. recognised) or several categories (some may be recognised while others are not) and 
that the pattern of contingency awareness is not consistent across subjects. This highlights the 
important point that subjects all had some degree of contingency awareness (no subjects had all of 
their contingencies classified as unaware by the recognition measure). However, this poses 
statistical problems because data from a subject may contribute more to one measure of awareness 
than another. If the missing data were replaced with variable means, then there was a significant 
main effect of UCS Type [F (2, 24) = 3.70, p = 0.040] and Bonferroni contrasts revealed a 
marginally significant difference between N-L and N-D pairings [F (1, 12) = 4.79, p = 0.049] for 
contingencies that were recognised. However, this analysis cannot and should not be taken as 
evidence that differential conditioning between N-L and N–D pairs was established, because the 
replacement of missing data was substantial. These statistical problems apply to any study in which 
awareness is assessed as a post hoc measure and nearly all of the EC literature has measured 
awareness in this way (indeed Baeyens et al., 1990a, were aware of this problem). As such, the data 
here are not presented as evidence that EC occurs only in the presence of contingency awareness, 
because there were too few contingencies of which subjects were unaware to draw any meaningful 
conclusions. Figure 1 suggests that there may even be a distinction between responding to 
contingencies of which subjects have explicit awareness and those of which subjects have only 
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implicit knowledge. However, the post hoc measures ensure that this interesting prospect must be 
speculative until a more systematic study can be done. 
5: Conclusions 
 
The data from the recognition awareness measure illustrate several points of general interest. (1) the 
sensitivity criterion of Shanks and St. John (1994) should be considered by any researcher interested 
in gauging awareness of experimental manipulations, contingencies or learning. The data presented 
here illustrate how different measures can lead to quite different conclusions regarding the 
awareness of subjects during experiments. For one thing it seems as though asking subjects to 
verbalise conscious knowledge may be a relatively insensitive measure of awareness that overlooks 
some of the knowledge that subjects posses. (2) to draw meaningful conclusions about whether 
awareness is necessary for a process to occur, it is imperative to try to manipulate awareness in a 
systematic way rather than merely measure it post hoc. There is a case for drawing conclusions 
from studies in which all subjects are unaware of all contingencies (i.e. subliminal conditioning), 
however, it is imperative that sensitive measures are used to ascertain that subjects were truly 
unaware. In addition, to verify that learning is associative, effects must be compared to nonpaired 
control groups. If awareness is not manipulated in a systematic way then accurate statistical 
analysis of the data is, in the majority of circumstances, going to be impossible. (3) there is tentative 
evidence that verbalizable knowledge of contingencies may lead to conditioning whereas 
nonverbalizable (a gut-feeling) knowledge may not. This finding suggests that there may be a 
threshold of awareness above which conditioning occurs. Hence, contingency awareness is not 
linearly related with the strength of conditioned responses. This implication has dramatic 
ramifications because many EC studies in which contingency awareness is measured have used an 
index of awareness that is assumed to correlate with CRs (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1988;. 1989a; 1992a, 
Evaluative Conditioning 
Page 31 
1993). In the light of the data in this paper, this methodology seems inappropriate and casts doubt 
on the conclusions from these studies. 
Several points, specific to the EC literature are also raised by this review. First, relating to the 
systematic manipulation of contingency awareness, few of the studies purporting to show 
conditioning without awareness have systematically tried to inflate or decrease awareness in a 
subset of subjects. One of the few studies that has attempted to manipulate contingency- and 
demand-awareness (Allen and Janiszewski, 1989) found that awareness was crucial in establishing 
conditioning effects. A second, related point is the importance of distinguishing demand awareness 
from awareness of experimental contingencies. Many of the studies cited in the literature as 
supporting a conditioning-without-awareness view have used only global measures of awareness 
that are not only insensitive, but are also likely to capture demand awareness more than specific 
contingency awareness (e.g. Bierley et al., 1985; Stuart et al., 1987). Their conclusions are, 
therefore, unlikely to inform us of the role of contingency awareness. Finally, the data presented 
here illustrate how most EC studies have used measures of awareness that inflate the number of 
contingencies of which subjects are aware that are classified as unaware (e.g. Baeyens et al., 
1990a). Much of the literature has looked at awareness as a sideline to the main purpose of the 
experiment (e.g. Hammerl and Grabitz, 1993; Baeyens et al., 1988; 1989a, 1989b; 1992a, 1992b; 
1993) and has used awareness measures based on Baeyens et al. (1990a). These studies are likely to 
have (1) considerably underestimated the levels of contingency awareness; and (2) classified as 
unaware many contingencies of which subjects were aware. The use of subliminally presented 
stimuli does offer a more promising approach, but the evidence from these studies is very 
inconclusive. Notwithstanding the earlier criticisms, there is some support that conditioning can 
occur without awareness but studies using subliminally presented stimuli have by no means 
provided conclusive evidence that this is a robust and substantive finding. In addition, some more 
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recent studies contradict this work by suggesting that (1) contingency awareness may be crucial in 
establishing EC (Fulcher & Cocks, 1997; Shimp et al., 1991; Allen and Janiszewski, 1998); and (2) 
the post hoc nature of awareness measures may lead to a substantial underestimation of levels of 
awareness (Fulcher & Cocks, 1997). 
To sum up the EC literature, there are many important measurement issues that suggest that few, if 
any, EC studies have genuinely captured associative learning without contingency awareness. Of 
course, this conclusion is not a final or damning one: indeed, the finding that conditioning occurs 
only in aware subjects does not eliminate the possibility that EC could never operate without 
awareness, it merely suggests that this possibility has yet to be demonstrated. This point is 
highlighted by the autonomic conditioning literature in which conditioning was believed to occur 
only in awareness, yet new evidence suggests that a subset of responses might be conditioned 
without awareness. On a theoretical level, there is a good deal to suggest that evaluative responses 
should be conditioned without awareness: (1) evaluations are a basic and ecologically important 
response (Zajonc, 1980); (2) levels-of-learning theories suggest that such basic responses should be 
conditioned outside of conscious control (Razran, 1955, 1971); and (3) if EC is not qualitatively 
distinct from autonomic conditioning (a position not held by Baeyens and his colleagues) then 
evaluative responses might be part of the ecologically-relevant response set (e.g. fear) that can 
conditioned outside of contingency awareness. Alternatively, if EC is distinct from autonomic 
conditioning then general evaluations may not be conditioned without contingency awareness, but 
ecologically-important evaluations (such as taste) might form an important subset of responses that 
can be conditioned outside of awareness. If this possibility were so, then EC would mimic what has 
been found using autonomic conditioning. However, to discover which of these possibilities is true, 
several methodological issues must be addressed. (1) A study needs to be done in which 
contingency awareness is manipulated systematically across subjects. Completely aware and 
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completely unaware subjects then need to be compared against subjects who received unpaired CS-
UCS presentations (see Field and Davey, 1998). (2) The role of nonverbalisible awareness needs to 
be investigated: the data presented in this paper show how the effect of verbalisable knowledge may 
be quite different to the effect of more implicit knowledge. (3) Awareness needs to be measured 
before subjects have the opportunity to forget contingencies of which they were aware. (4) Any 
measures of awareness that are used must be sensitive enough to detect the awareness that subjects 
posses.  
To conclude, despite the fact that EC has entered conditioning folklore as a qualitatively distinct 
form of associative learning that can occur in the absence of specific contingency awareness, there 
are many reasons to question this finding — especially when visual stimuli are used. There are 
methodological problems that make it probable that researchers have underestimate contingency 
awareness, or have misclassified contingencies. Recent empirically work has begun to contest the 
conditioning-without-awareness view also, and there is now evidence that the results of some early 
EC studies using visual stimuli may have been an artefact of the experimental procedure (see, Field 
& Davey, 1997, 1998, in press; Shanks and Dickinson, 1990). Until new work addresses these 
issues there is little unequivocal evidence that evaluative conditioning without contingency 
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Table 1: Table showing the number of contingencies classified as aware and unaware by both a 
strong awareness measure and a measure based on recognising experimental 




 Recognition Measure  
  
Aware Unaware Total 
Aware 21 1 22 
Strong Measure 
Unaware 24 6 30 
 




Table 2: Table to show the number of contingencies that subjects explicitly recognised 
postexperimentally compared to those that subjects had only a feeling that they had 
seen, and those that were unrecognised (see text for details). 
 
 
 Recognition Measure  
 
  Aware  
  
Unaware Recognise Know Total 
Unaware 6 11 13 30 
Strong 
Measure 
Aware 1 15 6 22 
 


















Figure 1 Legends: 
Y-Axis: Mean change in CS rating relative to control CSs. 
X-Axis: Level of Awareness 
Title: Graph to show the changes in CS ratings relative to the N-N control CSs depending on 
whether a liked or disliked UCS was used durting conditioning, and whether the subject 
recognised the contingency or had only a feeling that they had seen the contingency. 
